wambling through the semblances, part II
Paradoxically, the only real power we have left in Iraq is the power to withdraw. But it only becomes a power if we play it as a political and diplomatic card, not so much with the Iraqis themselves, as with their neighbors, who will inevitably become embroiled in the process. In other words, the decision for America, at this point, is not whether to leave. We only have any power at all over the upshot if we begin to leave now. But we must make the decision to leave pro-actively, and use it and its timing in a series of both confrontational and conciliatory diplomatic maneuvers with nations surrounding Iraq.
Perhaps it is a little too programmatic to say that all the paradigmatic divisions in the history of Islam are now focused on Iraq, but the statement embodies something not altogether remote from the truth. I used to say, as a cynical joke, that indeed God directed Bush to invade Iraq. It was just not his God. Allah, it seems, wants to resolve some of the old political and ethnic issues raised in His name. Damascus and Baghdad are the ancient seats of rival caliphates. Persian, Turk and Arab stand poised on the borders, while a Kurdish arc in the north finds its center in Iraq, but extends into both Turkey and Iran. Any nation that has tasted the bitter brutality of the Ottoman Empire tends to harbor a residual antipathy to the ethnic Turk. Arab Sunnis view the Persian Shia as heretics. The Shia view the Arabs as the murderers of their Imam. The Kurds are a thorn in the side of Iran and Turkey, where Kurdish insurgents dream of an independent state – a possibility if the Iraqi Kurds can defend their territory and thus retain their oil wealth.
In a recent interview, Dennis Kucinich advocates, not only a dialogue with Syria, but the assumption of a positive attitude toward the Syrian government. It is hard to assess how naïve he actually is, since the interview covers relatively narrow ground. But, to understand Syria today, we perhaps have to go back to the massacre at Hama in l982, an underreported event in which somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000 Sunnis, presumably adherents of the Moslem Brotherhood, died at the hands of the Shia minority government. From that point forward, Hafez al Assad and, since his death in 2000, his son Basher al Assad have ruled Syria by main force. While there were strong provocations leading up to the massacre, this is not necessarily a government with which we can make nice-nice, as its continued activities and influence in Lebanon have shown.
Basher is understandably eager to talk to the Americans, regardless of the issue of Israel, since, while his military is strong, his position is relatively tenuous. He does not have the oil wealth of Iran, Iraq or Saudi Arabia, so spillover turmoil in Iraq is extremely threatening.
The same kind of simultaneously iron-fisted and tenuous government rules in Saudi Arabia. It is, of course, hard to assess the actual situation in the kingdom of the Saud family, since it is a closed society, on the one hand, and an American ally, on the other. The likelihood that we are getting anything resembling accurate reporting concerning this country is relatively remote. Yet the motions of the Saudi diplomats and the public statements the government has made strongly suggest both that the Saudis have a hand in the present action in Iraq and that they are more than mildly disturbed by the possibilities of anarchy or open civil war on their northern border.
The Turks, of course, are threatened by Kurdish strength in northern Iraq, a fact that has been clearly reported in our media. If we leave without establishing levers or a special presence (of ourselves or others) in Kurdistan, at the invitation of the Kurdish people themselves, it is difficult to predict exactly what the Turks will do. Perhaps they are foolish and angry enough to become directly involved.
Basically, that leaves the Iranians, who are the only peoples or government that seem to be acting on the premise that they have something to gain by our departure. Perhaps, in a sense, they do. The liberation of the Iraqi Shia is a long-sought goal. But Iran hardly has the power to confront all of the forces now arrayed both within and outside Iraq.
Of course, dissembling in the face of deep danger is not only necessary for the Iranians – as well as for anyone else – for the Shia it is also a religious mandate. And Iranians assume they are in deep danger from us, as well they may be. Therefore it is hard to tell exactly how much of Iranian rhetoric at this point is bluff or deception. Because of Mossadegh, they have an absolute right to assume our hypocrisy. And because of the Shah, they detest us. But realpolitik at this point suggests that their impunity and their rhetoric largely depend on our unqualified commitment to stay. When it becomes evident that we will leave, I expect the song will change, and perhaps more than slightly.
In other words, if we leave without establishing the beginnings of a dialogue between the interested nations, we are creating a wonderful incentive for general warfare in the region, even, as I say, without considering the special issue of Israel. I doubt that it would be a boon for the various extremist Islamist movements, except in the shortest of short runs. They will either be preempted by larger, more generalized political forces, or smashed as an inconvenient distraction. But if we are compelled to return, as some who can only think in narrow circles have predicted as inevitable, we had better be prepared for the draft and fielding a full national army.
That the borders of the Middle East are arbitrary is a truism – a weird residue of waning European imperialism and the desires of indigenous political leaders at the end of World War I. When we hear Iraqis who apparently endorse nationalism as opposed to sectarianism, we seem to either hear a fear of sectarian violence or a fear for an undefended Iraq, or both. Or we hear the sycophancy of those who hope to gain power from the Americans. Undoubtedly, the history of Mesopotamia calls to many, as does the history of Baghdad. It is easy enough to say that individuals seeking power are playing on sectarian rivalry. The problem is that no reasonable political or social service structures existed after the dismissal of the Baathists. What we are looking at is very much the creation of government out of true anarchy. And while it involves all the appearances of emergent strongman government, in the present environment, it may well be a prelude to democracy. But democracy, like communism, cannot avoid the indigenous history. Islamic democracies will not necessarily resemble the U.S. government. And, of course, the democratic nature of the U.S. government at this point is still a moot question, particularly in our behavior toward such nations as Iraq.
But, in any case, if we hope to have any influence over the outcome, the least of our questions is the yes or no of withdrawal. The fact that the debate on this question is taking place in isolation in this country, without involving any other issue, suggests the raw simplicity of the American mindset, still, in terms of the world stage. We are the most powerful nation in the world, in spite of our present troubles, and yet we cannot think of international policy or relations except in the most simplistic terms of point A or B in our own behavior. Nuance, I suppose, is a word for wimps. And complexity is beyond the scope of our vocabulary.
Apart from withdrawal, the only power we have here is the truth. While other nations do not seem quite as blind to consequences as we are, at this moment, the problem with the future, in terms of Iraq, is the tiptoe hypocrisy, for example, that allows Iran to play the adversary-against-America card at every turn. The truth is that the mullahs are not in a much stronger position than the Saud family or Basher al Assad. Too bad we have zero credibility. If we could actually play the role of our self-image, if we could actually speak the truth of the situation both politically and diplomatically – find credible emissaries, Hajjis in full beards and robes if necessary, to address the surrounding nations with the truth of the situation and point out how little they have to gain, how much they have to lose, and the likelihood of the latter – we might help find a solution here.
Unfortunately, of course, even without the question of Israel, all of this is a pipe dream. The lonely paladin gunslinger mentality of the present administration, the endless burrowing machine of our hypocrisy and a shallowness based both on ignorance and an unwillingness to lift our noses off the mirror in the practice of international policy leave us essentially without resources. By the time Bush is out of office, we will have followed domestic political expediency and military necessity and begun a significant drawdown of troops without requiring the least actual concession or even interaction from Iraq’s neighbors. As a consequence, we will have absolutely no control over the outcome.
In Vietnam, at least we could have predicted the result – a relatively stable communist government. That result was undesirable enough, from our point of view, although the devastation of the country and the inevitable bureaucratic gaucherie of communism meant that we had achieved some of our objective, apparently slowing the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.
Would that we could assume even that minimal result in Iraq.
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