wambling through the semblances
The murk of equivocation is deep, but I assume from my limited and sidereal viewpoint – the standard for blogthink as well as expert opinion, apparently – that what is happening in Iraq is that the Shia are attempting to consolidate what they feel is their rightful presumption to power, while the Americans, under their proclaimed desire for a unity government, are seeking a malleable puppet and a block to the ‘Shia crescent’ proposed by Mr. Unpronounceable from Iran. In other words, what is thwarting development in Iraq is the loggerheads between the Shia and the Americans, and not the failure strictly of the Iraqis. A unity government is obviously not possible. But we need to mask the fact that the failure is based as much on our desires as the Iraqis.
A Shia government would probably have to respect some of the basic rights of the Sunni and the Kurds, at least in the long run. And, presumably, as much as the Shia would naturally ally themselves with Iran, I presume that they would resist anything resembling union. I expect part of the weakening of general support for certain kinds of Islamic radicalism can be laid to the present Iranian government. That, and al Qaeda’s penchant for murdering everyone, regardless of race, religion or national origin, are having their effect, as much as there is no lessening of the rhetoric against America.
If we believe in democracy, we ultimately have to let the Shia have the power. The only passage through radical Islam is to give the more moderate elements power. Or perhaps even the more radical elements. Nothing tempers fanaticism, in the long run, more than the exercise of actual political power. And, of course, finally, it is not about giving, but taking. As long as the present conditions prevail, radical Islam’s entrance into manifest political power is inevitable.
For us, of course, the question hinges, to some extent, on our own purposes in Iraq. We cannot extricate ourselves in any reasonable order without first confronting not only our own motives, ulterior or otherwise, but our own character as well.
We are all aware of the possible unriddling of the lack of exit plans in terms of projected permanent U.S. land bases in the Middle East. And the pervasive oil issue is self-evident, although it involves federal subservience to multi-national corporations as much as it does any legitimate question of national self-interest. We have largely lost control of the price of oil, in any case. But, of course, in the realm of politics, only religious fanatics and amateurs operate on a one-eyed, fixed idea. However, what we are addressing here, finally, is not so much our desires for Iraq as our own national character: the classic equivocation of the American. We continue to live under the self-label of Mr. Neutral – the ultimate arbiter, the ultimate objectivist – a political orientation that has inevitably defeated even our most successful imperialist forays. Unless we have a distinct enemy – e.g., communism – we lack the wicked persistence of the good imperialist. And this is as true of the clandestine agencies of the U.S. government that have been covertly fomenting imperialism for generations as it is of the American people. Clandestine imperialism is ultimately an oxymoron. It’s not simply that it doesn’t work. It takes an overt John Bull national personality to make a good imperialistic nation. As much as we are a hugely self-righteous people on a person-by-person basis, as a nation we see ourselves as innocently good and the arbiters of the good.
John Bull in his heyday would have found agents in all the factions and be playing them off each other with grand aplomb. The internecine body count would be the obvious marker of the progress of British policy. The domestic press would use it as a double-edged sword, tacitly certifying the bloodshed as the onward march of British success while equally demonstrating the necessity of British dominion and guidance, since the indigenous heathen were obviously beneath civilization, bent on self-destruction and anarchy. Not only would the good Briton feel his Christian duty in the action, but would immediately send the necessary missionaries.
America will never be able to act the part. It’s not the left or the Democrats. It’s how we view ourselves as a people. There may be an ongoing small minority of screaming nationalists who will insist on an overt imperialist policy. But even a substantial block of Republicans see America as The Arbiter and not the insatiable emissary of Mars. We are the objectivist nation. When we had Sadr in our grasp, instead of blowing him to smithereens, we deferred to Ali Sistani (whom we continued, for a time, to overtly ignore) and negotiated a truce. In a nation such as Iraq, whose recent history is largely based on raw power, the failure to execute final judgment in the most obvious way could only be perceived as weakness. Elements, not only of civil strife but also of insurrectionary feeling against any occupying force, were evident from the beginning. But our strange pas à deux with al Sadr seems to have instigated both general anarchy and pervasively coordinated action.
But this is precisely who we are. Precisely because we had him in a stranglehold, we were willing to negotiate. At the moment that he’s helpless, we can no longer eliminate him. Because we’re the good guys. We don’t hit somebody when they’re down. And we’re always going to be this way. The American soldier, even when he was a draftee, commonly had and has an almost casual courage. The American military is a first-strike instrument feared throughout the world. But the American character, in terms of our own ideal, will always be the good guy and the arbiter.
But this means we can’t take sides. We can’t say to the Shia, ‘OK, we’ll cut a deal with you. We’ll give you this, and you’ll give us that; and too bad about the Sunnis.’ Because this is what’s going to happen, whether we like it or not; and so we might as well play the game the way the cards are laid. But no. We are also Muhammad Ali: we’re the greatest. We can do anything, if we just put our minds to it – the great can-do America. So we’re going to construct a government that can’t be constructed. We should have made a choice. Either we take the Shia, give them the power, but cut a deal with sufficient handles or a sufficient American presence to enforce it; or divide the nation according to sectors, allow the migration of populations, subsidize the rebuilding and keep a presence where needed, both militarily and diplomatically, to enforce the division.
But as the objectivist, as the arbiter, we couldn’t make the choice ‘for the Iraqis’. We believe in democracy. They have to do it.
Well, they’re doing it, alright.
At the same time, as kind of an aside (but isn’t this all kind of an aside?), I can’t help wondering about Shiism and the west. The religion may seem strange to us. But the Shia are traditionally Persian, and Persia is Indo-European in origins. Perhaps shared ancient roots are meaningless. But Shia mystics commonly reverted to certain elements in the western philosophical and mystical traditions – one of the reasons that Sunnis, as Arab and therefore Semitic, considered the Shia heretical. Maybe this verges on the ‘racial’, and is therefore anathema in contemporary ‘intellectual’ western discourse. But I can’t help wondering, in the long run – if we could somehow get out of our military mindset in the Middle East – if there isn’t some basis, today, for kinship between the Shia and the west.
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